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This paper examines the role of judicial review in adminis-
trative enforcement cases under the authority of the Export
Administration Act (EAA).' The Administration has been
working with Congress on a renewed Export Administration
Act with stronger enforcement provisions. In September 1999,
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
passed Senate Bill 1712 (S. 1712), the Export Administration
Act of 1999.2 S. 1712 would change the judicial review of en-
forcement cases to.improve and simplify the process and main-
tain consistency with other civil penalty cases at the Depart-
ment of Commerce ("Commerce").
II. EXPORT CONTROL CASES
Export enforcement cases of the Bureau of Export Admin-
istration (BXA) proceed on two tracks: criminal and adminis-
trative. Special agents in BXA's Office of Export Enforcement
(OEE) and the U.S. Customs Service investigate violations of
* This paper is based on remarks delivered by Assistant Secretary DeBusk
at the Court of International Trade's Eleventh Judicial Conference in December
1999. The following people contributed to this article: Susan Silver, Export En-
forcement Policy Analyst, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement;
Thomas Barbour, Director of Enforcement and Litigation Division; Matthew
Borman, Senior Advisor; and Sandra Lambright, Paralegal Specialist; all from the
Office of Chief Counsel for Export Administration.
1. The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. §§
2401-2420 (1988) (expired Aug. 20, 1994). See also Exec. Order No. 12,924, 3
C.F.R. § 917 (1995), extended by Presidential Notices of Aug. 15, 1995, 3 C.F.R. §
501 (1996); Aug. 14, 1996, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1997); Aug. 13, 1997, 3 C.F.R. § 306
(1998); Aug. 13, 1998, 3 C.F.R. § 294 (1999); and Aug. 10, 1999, 3 C.F.R. § 302
(2000) (all of which continued the Export Administration Regulations in effect,
using his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000)).
2. Export Administration Act, S. 1712, 106th Cong. (1999). The 106th Con-
gress adjourned without voting on S. 1712. On January 23, 2001, Senate Bill 199,
107th Cong. (2001) (which contains substantially the same provisions regarding
administrative procedure and judicial review as S. 1712) was introduced into the
107th Congress.
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the Export Administration Act and Export Administration
Regulations (EAR).' Special agents work with an Assistant
United States Attorney from the Department of Justice to
develop a potential criminal case. These cases may be brought
in the U.S. District Court sitting in the jurisdiction where the
violation occurred.4 Cases also may be brought in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia on the theory that
the offense, failure to obtain a license, occurs in Washington,
D.C., where the Commerce Department issues licenses. If the
offenses were begun in one district and completed in another,
cases may be prosecuted in the district where the offense was
begun, continued, or completed.5 If the offenses were not com-
mitted in any district, cases may be brought at the last known
address of the offender, or if unknown, in the District of Co-
lumbia.6 Criminal cases can be appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals and eventually to the U.S. Supreme Court.
III. CIVIL CASES
The majority of BXA's administrative cases result in civil
settlements. In those instances where there are reasonable
prospects for settlement, the Office of Export Enforcement will
issue a proposed charging letter (PCL) containing the viola-
tions believed to constitute the offense.7 Settlement negotia-
tions are conducted by the Director of the Office of Export
Enforcement, and the Office of Chief Counsel.8 Once a settle-
ment agreement is reached, the respondent and the OEE Di-
rector sign the agreement. However, the settlement is not final
until the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement signs the
implementing order imposing the agreed resolution, which can
include civil monetary penalties and denial of export privileg-
es.
9
3. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.9(b), 758.7(b) (1985).
4. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3231(34) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
5. See id. § 3231(35).
6. See id. § 3231(34).
7. See 15 C.F.R. § 766.20(a) (1985).
8. See id.
9. See id. See also 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (1985).
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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
For those cases that are not settled, EAR provides a struc-
ture for administrative enforcement proceedings. In 1988,
Congress amended the EAA to require notice and opportunity
for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (rather than
the Hearing Commissioner, as had been the case previously),
subject to some newly-added EAA provisions." These amend-
ments created a limited opportunity for judicial review for
export enforcement cases. However, this change did not apply
to antiboycott proceedings. As a result of amendments in the
late 1970's, antiboycott cases are subject to Sections 554
through 557 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)."
When Commerce brings an enforcement action against an
exporter in an export enforcement case, OEE sends a charging
letter to the party alleged to have committed the violations. As
in the PCL, the charging letter contains the facts believed to
constitute the offense. The charged party is entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard before an Administrative Law
Judge (AIJ). Notably, there is significant flexibility in an ALJ
proceeding. Formal rules of evidence are inapplicable. 2 For
example, the EAR hearing provisions state that "all evidentia-
ry material deemed by the Administrative Law Judge to be
relevant and material to the proceeding and not unduly repeti-
tious will be received and given appropriate weight."" Parties
are free to modify any procedures or extend any applicable
time limitations by stipulation filed with the ALJ.4 In addi-
tion, parties are able to conclude the proceedings through a
settlement agreement, which does not have to be approved by
the ALJ.5 The ALJ may order compliance with discovery and,
absent compliance, "may make a determination or enter any
order in the proceeding as the judge deems reasonable and
appropriate." 6 The ALJ may strike related charges or offens-
es and may take related facts as being established.'
10. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410.
11. See id.
12. See 15 C.F.R. § 766.13(b) (1985).
13. Id.
14. See id. § 766.16.
15. See id. § 766.18.
16. 15 C.F.R. § 766.9(d) (1985).
17. See id.
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The AUJ proceeding must be concluded within one year, as
required by EAA."8 Once the A.J has rendered a decision, it
must be referred to the agency head, in this case, the Under
-Secretary for Export Administration.19 The Under Secretary
will review the AU's findings of facts and conclusions of law.
Within 30 days, the Under Secretary must affirm, modify, or
vacate the AI's decision; however, the Under Secretary is not
permitted to reverse the decision, as in the APA.2"
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEDURES UNDER 1979 EAA
The charged party can appeal the Under Secretary's deci-
sion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.2 The circuit court's review is limited only to those issues
necessary to determine liability for the civil penalty or other
sanctions involved. 2 The court "shall set aside any finding of
fact for which the court finds there is not substantial evidence
on the record and any conclusion of law which the court finds
to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."' This has been held to exclude
review of the amount of penalty imposed.24
VI. IRAN AIR V. KUGELMAN
The role and authority of agency decisions in judicial re-
view was clarified in Iran Air v. Kugelman In this case,
Iran Air had ordered three signal generators from a German-
based company, Fluke Germany, for export to Iran. The pur-
chase order stated, "Please ship to Iran Air Frankfurt Airport
for reforwarding to Tehran, Iran."26 Although Fluke Germany
did not have the generators in stock, the company referred the
order to its affiliate, Fluke Holland.27 Fluke Holland did not
have the generators either, but obtained them from the U.S.






24. See Moller-Butcher v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 12 F.3d 249 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
25. 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
26. Id. at 1255.
27. See id.
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manufacturer, Fluke U.S.A.28 Fluke Germany delivered the
Fluke generators to Iran Air in Germany. Iran Air shipped the
generators to Iran without obtaining the required reexport
authorization.29
The Office of Export Enforcement initiated an administra-
tive proceeding against Iran Air for EAR violations. OEE al-
leged that Iran Air caused the reexport of the generators to
Iran without the required reexport authorization." The AUJ
dismissed the charge ruling that OEE failed to allege or prove
that Iran Air knowingly had violated the law.3' Upon referral,
the Acting Under Secretary for Export Administration dis-
agreed with the AL's reading of the Export Administration
Act. The Acting Under Secretary ruled that the civil sanction
included no state of mind requirement, 2 and remanded the
case to the ALJ for reconsideration consistent with the
agency's view of the controlling law. On remand, the ALJ re-
fused to follow the Acting Under Secretary's interpretation of
the law and dismissed the case again, ruling that the Acting
Under Secretary only was authorized to "affirm, modify or
vacate" the AUJ's decision.33
Once more, the Acting Under Secretary vacated the ALJ's
decision and remanded the case for a determination that
knowledge was not a required element of the case. Again, the
ALJ refused to do so, claiming a warning letter was the appro-
priate penalty. In his final order, the Acting Under Secretary
restated the agency's position. Concluding that a further re-
mand would be futile, the Acting Under Secretary imposed a
$100,000 civil penalty.34
Iran Air appealed the Acting Under Secretary's decision to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia arguing that
the ALJ's decision was correct and no penalty should be im-
posed. 5 The circuit court disagreed with Iran Air, holding
that the regulations under which Iran Air was charged did not
require the government to establish the state of mind of the
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1256.
30. See id.
31. Iran Air, 996 F.2d at 1253.
32. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410.
33. Iran Air, 996 F.2d at 1256.
34. See id. at 1257.
35. See id.
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exporter, because the word "knowingly" was expressly deleted
from the regulation which Iran Air was charged with violat-
ing."6 This is an important point, because there is a regula-
tion that contains a "knowing element," but Iran Air was not
charged with violating that regulation. 7 The D.C. Circuit
Court affirmed the Under Secretary's ruling that Iran Air vio-
lated the Export Administration Act and Export Administra-
tion Regulations. The court also held that the Under Secretary
remains the final administrative arbiter on questions of law
and policy.3"
The court distinguished its decision from Dart v. United
States." In that case, the D.C. Circuit Court had held that
the Under Secretary owed deference to the factual determina-
tion of the A_. 4 ° In Iran Air, the court drew a distinction
between factual and legal determinations.4 The court ex-
plained that the agency head may not overturn the ALJ's deci-
sion on findings of fact.42 The court declined, however, to ex-
tend the Dart precedent beyond fact findings to questions of
agency law or policy.43 The court affirmed the Under
Secretary's ruling that Iran Air violated the EAA, but vacated
the sanctions imposed and remanded the case to the Acting
Under Secretary for a reasoned determination of the appropri-
ate sanction consistent with the ALJ's assessment of the facts
and the circumstances of Iran Air's violations."
Iran Air is important because it underscores the deference
the Court has shown to agency decisions on matters involving
interpretation of its own regulations. The Court's decision was
appropriate because the agency has the expertise to interpret
the regulations it issues and implements.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1257-58.
38. See id. at 1262.
39. 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40. See id. at 230-31.
41. See Iran Air, 996 F.2d at 1291.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1262.
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VII. TEMPORARY DENIAL ORDERS
Judicial review of temporary denial orders (TDOs) pro-
ceeds along the same basis. The Assistant Secretary for Export
Enforcement may impose, on an ex parte basis, a temporary
denial order for up to 180 days without an administrative
hearing to prevent an imminent export violation.45 The ex-
porter subject to a TDO can appeal in writing to an AJ.46
After reviewing the pleadings, within ten working days, the
ALJ makes a recommendation to the Under Secretary as to
whether the TDO should stand. Within five working days, the
Under Secretary can accept, reject, or modify the AU,'s deci-
sion." The exporter may appeal this decision within 15 work-
ing days to the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.48 The court may review the issues relating to whether the
standard for issuing TDOs (to prevent an imminent violation of
the EAA) has been met. The court will vacate the order if it
finds that the ruling was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."49 This
review process is not available during the lapse of the EAA.
VIII. CHANGES TO JuDiciAL REVIEW IN S. 1712
S. 1712 would change the judicial review provisions relat-
ed to administrative enforcement cases, consistent with the
provisions in the Administration's 1994 proposed Export Ad-
ministration Act. Under S. 1712, judicial review of anti-boycott
and export enforcement cases would be treated the same
way.50 S. 1712 would revise current practice for both anti-boy-
cott and export enforcement violations, which requires that, if
the civil penalty is imposed, but not paid, the U.S. government
must file actions to collect the unpaid penalty in district court,
where all issues necessary to establish liability are established
de novo.51
45. See 15 C.F.R. § 766.24(a)(b)(4) (1985).
46. See id. § 766.24(e).
47. See id.
48. See id. § 766.24(g). See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(d)(3).
49. 15 C.F.R. § 766.24 (1985).
50. See Export Administration Act, S. 1712, 106th Cong. § 608 (1999).
51. See id.
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In 1994, the Administration proposed to make enforcement
proceedings under the EAA subject to judicial review under the
APA,52 as with most other civil penalty matters. This pro-
posed change is contained in S. 1712. 53 Essentially, this
means that cases would be reviewed by the district court,
based on the administrative record, to determine if the agency
decision had been made on arbitrary or capricious grounds.
S. 1712 also simplifies the administrative enforcement
process at Commerce by making all of the enforcement cases
subject to Sections 554 through 557 of the APA.' Thus, re-
view by the Under Secretary would no longer be required. The
exporter, however, would have the right to appeal the ALJ's
decision to the Under Secretary. If the exporter does not ap-
peal, the decision of the ALJ becomes the decision of the De-
partment; which is standard for other cases that are subject to
the APA and is what happens in boycott cases today.5 The
process for reviewing TDOs would remain the same as that
under the lapsed EAA, with a change for the standard of re-
view to become "reasonable cause to believe."56
IX. CONCLUSION
These changes would simplify the review process, make
the process work better, help maintain consistency in anti-
boycott and enforcement cases, and bring the process in line
with other civil penalty cases at the Commerce Department.
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (1994).
53. Export Administration Act, S. 1712, 106th Cong. § 608 (1999).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
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